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invoked to determine whether the decedent had completely divested
himself of the property at the time of the transfer, as in the Skinner
case. There were also cases in which agreements were used as a
makeweight in finding a tax liability, as in McNichol, but no cases
squarely holding that no tax would be imposed on continued pos-
session or enjoyment in the absence of an agreement.
The Treasury contends that if the decedent transferred his home
to his wife or to his children, the full value of the home should be
included in his gross estate in any of the three following situations:
(1) if by state law he had a legally enforceable right to live in the
home as long as it belonged to his wife, or (2) if he was discharging
a legal obligation to support his wife or children, or (3) if he con-
tinued to reside in the residence until his death."
In light of the literal wording of section 2036 and the apparent
policy behind the statute to prevent tax avoidance, it is submitted
that the Treasury's position is sound and should be followed.
WILLIAm S. LOWNDES
Torts-Implied Warranty in Real Estate-Privity Requirement
The principle of caveat emptor' in real property sales is begin-
ning to show cracks in what previously was its impregnable structure.
In 1936 Professor Williston said, "There are no implied warranties
in sales of real estate."2 Although this is still the rule in a vast
majority of the jurisdictions in the United States,3 the reasoning
behind it seems to be weakening.
The first inroad into the principle involved houses to be con-
"0 Speech by Chief Counsel Sept. 19, 1964, as reported in 4 REsEARcH
INSTITUTE TAX COORDxNATOR 47008C (1965).
'The North Carolina view is that caveat emptor will be followed in
the sale of real property provided no fraud is involved. Smathers v. Gilmer,
126 N.C. 757, 759, 36 S.E. 153, 154 (1900). For a further discussion of the
North Carolina view see 42 N.C.L. Rav. 946, 951 (1964). See generally
Bearman, Caveat Emptor in Sales of Realty, 14 VAND. L. Rxv. 541 (1961);
Dunham, Vendor's Obligation as to Fitness of Land for a Particular Purpose,
37 MINN. L. REv. 108 (1953); Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat
Emptor, 40 YALE L.J. 1133 (1931); Comment, 5 DE PAuL L. REv. 263
(1956); Note, 4 W. REs. L. REv. 357 (1953).
4 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 926, at 2602 (rev. ed. 1936).
'E.g., Narup v. Higgins, 51 Ill. App. 2d 102, 200 N.E.2d 922 (1964);
Coutrakon v. Adams, 39 Ill. App. 2d 290, 188 N.E.2d 780 (1963); Shapiro
v. Kornicks, 103 Ohio App. 49, 124 N.E.2d 175 (1955); Steiber v. Palumbo,
219 Ore. 479, 347 P.2d 978 (1959). See 55 Am. Jum. Vendor and Purchaser
§ 368 (1946); Annot., 78 A.L.R.2d 446 (1961).
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structed or in the process of construction.4 In these instances some
courts have permitted the immediate vendee to recover for defects
in the house on an implied warranty.' This rule is receiving in-
creasing support but is not yet unanimous. 6
A very small minority of United States jurisdictions that have
considered the problem have gone so far as to allow an implied
warranty to survive the completion of the house.' In Carpenter v.
Donohoe8 the plaintiffs purchased a house built by the defendant.
Four months later the walls began to crack. The suit was based on
fraud and breach of implied warranties. The Supreme Court of
Colorado held that the implied warranty doctrine would be extended
"to include agreements between builder-vendors and purchasers for
the sale of newly constructed buildings, completed at the time of
contracting."9 The court continued, "Where . . . a home is the
subject of sale, there are implied warranties that the home was built
in workmanlike manner and is suitable for habitation."'" In the
Donohoe case, there was privity of contract between the parties.
This would seem essential where the plaintiff is suing on a contrac-
tual theory." But where personal injury is involved, privity would
not be essential, since the suit would be in tort and not contract.'
2
This exception to the doctrine of caveat emptor in the sales of real
property seems to have originated in England. Miller v. Cannon Hill
Estates, Ltd., [1931] 2 K.B. 113. In that case the vendee contracted with
the builder-vendor of a housing development to buy a house then being
constructed. Structural defects appeared in the house and the vendee sued.
The court held the vendor liable for breach of an express warranty and for
breach of an implied warranty of fitness for habitation.
'E.g., Weck v. A :M Sunrise Constr. Co., 36 Ill. App. 2d 383, 184 N.E.2d
728 (1962); Gilbert Constr. Co. v. Gross, 212 Md. 402, 129 A.2d 518
(1957); Vanderschrier v. Aaron, 103 Ohio App. 340, 140 N.E.2d 819
(1957); Hoye v. Century Builders, Inc., 52 Wash. 2d 830, 329 P.2d 474
(1958).
6 See cases cited note 3 supra.
Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. -, 388 P.2d 399 (1964) ; Schipper v.
Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965). Louisiana has
adopted the doctrine of redhibition which has established an implied warranty
in sales of real estate as well as chattels. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. arts. 2520-48
(1952).
'154 Colo-, 388 P.2d 399 (1964).
Id. at -, 388 P.2d at 402.
10 Ibid.
1 It is a basic rule of contracts that an essential element of a cause of
action on a contract, or based on a contractual theory, is privity of contract.
E.g., Fowler v. Athens City Waterworks Co., 83 Ga. 219, 9 S.E. 673 (1889);
Sterback v. Robinson, 148 Md. 24, 128 Atl. 894 (1925). See 2 WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS § 347, at 794 (3d ed. 1959).
See PRossna, TORTS § 97, at 681 (3d ed. 1963).
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In this situation, sales of real property should be on the same footing
as sales of chattels.' The Supreme Court of New Jersey in
Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc.14 recognized this difference. In
that case the defendant corporation was a mass builder-vendor of
houses. Its vendee lived in one of the houses for two years and
then leased the house to one of the plaintiffs. When the house was
built, the defendant equipped it with a hot water system that was
directly connected with the heating system of the house. Since the
water that came from the hot water tap was almost boiling, one
first had to turn on the cold water to reduce the temperature. The
infant plaintiff was severely burned when he turned on the hot
water without first turning on the cold water. The Supreme Court
of New Jersey held the defendant liable on the theories of negli-
gence 5 and breach of implied warranty of habitability.' 6 In abro-
gating the privity requirement, the court drew an analogy to sales
of chattels, saying that there is no meaningful distinction between
a mass producer of automobiles and a mass builder of homes."'
Various reasons have been advanced for not requiring privity
where a person injured by a chattel sues the manufacturer:
(1) Since only the manufacturer can comprehend the intricacies
of his product, he should be responsible for the defects which cause
injuries to those who could foreseeably be expected to use the
product.'
(2) The consumer has no control over the precautions the manu-
facturer takes in making the product. Thus, the manufacturer
should have the responsibility of making the product reasonably
safe.' 0
" See generally PRossER, To RTS § 97 (3d ed. 1963); Prosser, The As-
sault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J.
1099 (1960); Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J.
1 (1965).44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
1 Id. at -, 207 A.2d at 328. Although this was the first time the
Supreme Court of New Jersey had held a building contractor liable for
negligence without requiring privity, other jurisdictions in the United States
had done so before. Dow v. Holly Mfg. Co., 49 Cal. 2d 720, 321 P.2d 736
(1958); Colbert v. Holland Furnace Co., 333 Ill. 78, 164 N.E. 162 (1928);
Annot., 13 A.L.R.2d 191 (1950).
" 44 N.J. at -, 207 A.2d at 328.
17 Id. at -, 207 A.2d at 325.
"' Comment, 16 BAYLOR L. REV. 263, 266 (1964).
19 Gladiola Biscuit Co. v. Southern Ice Co., 267 F.2d 138 (5th Cir.
1959). See generally Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability
to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
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(3) Placing liability on the manufacturer would best insure the
life and health of the consumer.
20
(4) The manufacturer is better able to distribute the risk of
loss to the general public through insurance and slightly increased
prices.2-
These policy reasons would seem to apply equally well to the
situation presented in the Schipper case where defendant is a mass
builder of houses.
In time it is likely that more courts in the United States will
follow the New Jersey decision. The process of change will be slow,
however, for precedent must be overcome. The basic obstacle facing
the courts is the rule of law that all the provisions of the antecedent
contract in the sale of real estate are merged in the deed, which
becomes prima facie the total obligation of the parties.2 2 Once the
court has permitted an implied warranty to survive acceptance of
the deed, another problem arises. Warranty is associated with
contract, and if there is no privity between the plaintiff and de-
fendant, there can be no warranty, and, hence, no breach of war-
ranty.23
Originally breach of warranty sounded in tort since it was an
action on the case. Thus there was no privity requirement.2 4 When
the method of declaring on a warranty became indebitatus assump-
sit, the tort elements were lost,2" breach of warranty became a part
of contract law, and privity was required.2 But in a personal injury
case, the plaintiff is not suing on the contract. According to the
Restatement of Torts, "The liability stated is one of tort, and does
not require any contractual relation, or privity of contract, between
the plaintiff and the defendant .... It is strict liability .... The basis
"Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d
828 (1942).
"PROSSER, TORTS § 84 (2d ed. 1955).
" E.g., Ridley v. Moyer, 230 Ala. 517, 161 So. 526 (1935); Duncan
v. McAdams, 222 Ark. 143, 257 S.W.2d 568 (1953); Percifield v. Rosa, 122
Colo. 167, 220 P.2d 546 (1950).
" E.g., Welshausen v. Charles Parker Co., 83 Conn. 231, 76 At. 271
(1910); Flaccomio v. Eysink, 129 Md. 367, 100 Atl. 510 (1916); Wood v.
Advance Rumely Thresher Co., 60 N.D. 384, 234 N.W. 517 (1931).
24 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 195 (3d ed. 1948); Ames, History of Assumpsit,
2 HARV. L. REv. 1, 8 (1888).
"Jeanblanc, Manufacturer's Liability to Persons Other Than Their
Immediate Vendees, 24 VA. L. Rav. 134, 149 (1937).
26 See cases cited note 23 supra.
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of liability is purely one of tort."2 Damages are measured in tort.8
The warranty is one imposed by law and does not derive from the
mutual consent of the parties.29 The liability being one of tort,80
the merger theory and the privity theory have no relevance in the
sales of real property where personal injury is involved.
Of course, there must be limitations to the extent of this strict
liability., It should not be feared that strict tort liability would
be unlimited once the privity requirement is abrogated, for the
rules governing the sales of chattels seem to provide logical limits.
In the chattels field "no one has yet recovered for personal in-
juries, on the basis of strict liability without privity, who could not
fairly be called a consumer of the product, or at least a user." 2 Thus,
in the sales of chattels, where there is personal injury involved, the
courts hold the manufacturer strictly liable only to foreseeable plain-
tiffs.8" This would also seem to be the logical limit in the sales of
real property. Surely public policy demands that the builder be held
strictly liable to those who he could reasonably foresee would be
injured by a defect in the house.
There is another problem which must be considered: for what
period of time will this strict liability apply to the builder? It
would seem that there are two logical solutions. In the Schipper
case the court said that three years was a reasonable time under
the circumstances.34 What is a reasonable time must be determined
on the facts of each case. The statute of limitations might provide
another solution to the problem. The North Carolina statute of
limitations provides a three-year limitation on an action for injury
2
"RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 402A, comments, 1, m (1965).
'" Comment, 10 HASTINGS L.J. 418, 424 (1959).
2' Ibid.
'o Dean Prosser, speaking about chattels, aptly expresses the idea when
he says, "If there is to be strict liability in tort, let there be strict liability
in tort, declared outright, without an illusory contract mask." Prosser, The
Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J.
1099, 1134 (1960).
"1 The Supreme Court of New Jersey recognized that there must be
certain limitations to this strict liability when they said, "Issues of notice,
time limitation and measure of proof, which have not really been discussed
in the briefs, would seem to be indistinguishable from those which have
been arising in the products liability field .... ." 44 N. J. at -, 207 A.2d at
328.
82 PROSSER, TORTS § 97, at 682 (3d ed. 1963).
82 Connolly v. Hagi, 24 Conn. Supp. 198, 188 A.2d 884 (Super. Ct. 1963).
For a case which holds that the plaintiff was not an intended user see
Kuschy v. Norris, 25 Conn. Supp. 383, 206 A.2d 275 (Super. Ct. 1964).
8,44 N.J. at --, 207 A.2d at 328.
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to the person. It is further provided that the statute begins to
run when the cause of action accrues36 and, as interpreted by the
North Carolina Supreme Court, this is when the defendant com-
mitted the tort and not when the plaintiff first acquired knowledge
of the tort." In the cases in which the North Carolina Supreme
Court has interpreted the statute, a nominal injury had to occur to
begin the running of the statute.38 Perhaps, the courts could apply
this rule as a limit in the case of a builder and have the statute
begin to run at the time the house was sold although the plaintiff
had not yet suffered any personal injury.
39
It is important to note that the doctrine of strict liability would
not relieve the plaintiff of sustaining his burden of proof.40 As in
sales of chattels, the plaintiff would still have to prove that his injury
was caused by a defect in the house41 and that the defect existed
when the house left the hands of the defendant.4 The time for
which the builder's liability would exist would be limited further
by the burden of proof since, as time passed, it would be more
difficult to prove that the defect existed when the house left the
hands of the builder.
The question may arise whether strict liability would apply to
the builder of a single house. In this situation, the court has two
basic policies to consider. First, the builder of one house could not
distribute the risk of loss to the general public any better than could
the injured plaintiff. On the other hand, since the injured plaintiff
had no real opportunity to inspect the house, the builder should
have the responsibility of making the house reasonably safe for
all foreseeable users. The outcome of the case may depend upon
which policy the court considers more significant.
In the not-too-distant future, it is likely that the strict liability
principles applied in Schipper will be extended to other fields. Dean
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-52(5) (1953).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15 (1953).
"E.g., Shearin v. Lloyd, 246 N.C. 363, 98 S.E.2d 508 (1957); Lewis
v. Shaver, 236 N.C. 510, 73 S.E.2d 320 (1952).
"s Ibid.
"In Thurston Motor Lines, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 258 N.C.
323, 128 S.E.2d 413 (1962) the court said that it would not decide whether
the statute would begin to run if there had been no injury at all. Id. at 326,
128 S.E.2d at 416. If the court would not do so, the legislature could enact
a statutory exception to the rule.
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Prosser states, "As to defendants other than sellers, who supply
chattels under contract, there has as yet been no suggestion of any
strict liability to third persons."4 But considering that the law
has expanded from liability for negligence where there is no priv-
ity" to strict liability in real estate4' notwithstanding the doctrine
of caveat emptor, the day may come when strict liability without
privity will be applied to defendants other than sellers. 6
THOMAS SIDNEY SMITH
Torts-Nondelegable Duty-Direct and Vicarious Liability
for Negligence
The plaintiff in a recent North Carolina case1 recovered from
the general concessionaire2 of a county fair for injuries received
when she was thrown from a carnival ride owned and operated by
an independent contractor. The retaining bar of the ride was found
to be difficult to close, and the independent contractor, not a de-
fendant in the suit, was found to be negligent in failing to ascertain
whether the retaining bar securing the plaintiff was closed and
properly latched. The ride was determined to be "inherently dan-
gerous,"'3 i.e., that it was such a ride as was likely to cause injury
to passengers unless due care was exercised in its maintenance and
operation. The jury also found the defendant concessionaire negli-
gent in failing to inspect the ride and its operation to see that it
was maintained and operated with due care.
It is the general rule that an employer is not ordinarily liable
for the negligent acts of his independent contractor; however this
rule has numerous exceptions.' They are so numerous, in fact, that
" Id. § 98, at 685.
" MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
" 44 N.J. at -, 207 A.2d at 328.
" It must be noted that the Supreme Court of New Jersey held the de-
fendant liable on the alternate grounds of negligence and implied warranty
of habitability. The alternate holding of negligence may tend to minimize
the import of the court's decision on implied warranty. Whether the court
will follow this case as a precedent, where no negligence is alleged, re-
mains to be seen.
'Dockery v. World of Mirth Shows, Inc., 264 N.C. 406, 142 S.E.2d
29 (1965).
'Hereinafter the terms concessionaire, employer, or owner will be
used to designate the person who contracts with the independent contractor.
'264 N.C. at 414, 142 S.E.2d at 35.
'2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 26.11 (1956); MECHEM, AGENCY §§ 480-
90 (4th ed. 1952); PROSSER, TORTS § 70 (3d ed. 1964); RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND), TORTS §§ 409-29 (1965).
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